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DISCRIMINATION IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA: THE NEW 
DANGERS OF CAT’S PAW LIABILITY 
Taylor N. Brailey* 
The increase of Internet technology has brought human interaction to an 
unprecedented level of complexity.1 Individuals now find ways to stay 
connected to one another through online platforms, such as increasingly-
popular social media websites.2 These websites are characterized, among 
other things, by the efficiency with which individuals may share personal 
information within a certain network of people. This increase in information 
sharing and inter-connectedness has prompted state legislatures to recognize 
the need for legislation to protect employee privacy, and many states have 
acted on that need.3 To date, twenty-five states have passed laws that limit an 
employer’s ability to require or request usernames and passwords or to 
otherwise require access to employee and prospective employee social media 
profiles,4 and another fifteen states are considering similar legislation.5 These 
laws provide guidance to employers on how to respect the individual privacy 
interests of current and potential employees. 
                                                                                                                           
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 2017; B.A., Psychology, The 
Pennsylvania State University, 2014. Special thanks to my parents, Tracy and Patrick, and my sister, 
Morgan, for their support during the writing of this note. 
1 See Guo-Ming Chen, The Impact of New Media on Intercultural Communication in Global 
Context, 8(2) CHINA MEDIA RESEARCH 1, 3 (2012) (discussing the impact of new media on globalization). 
2 See, e.g., Top sites in United States, ALEXA INTERNET, http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries/ 
US (indicating that at least five of the top twenty-five most visited sites in the United States—YouTube, 
Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram—are social media sites) (last visited Dec. 30, 2015). 
3 See Katrina Grider, The “Best of” Litigation Update 2015: Employment Law Update, 70 THE 
ADVOC. 138 (2015) (“The legislative torrent has been virtually unprecedented in the area of workplace 
privacy.”). 
4 See State Laws About Social Media Privacy, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-laws-prohibiting-
access-to-social-media-usernames-and-passwords.aspx#stat (Jan. 11, 2017). 
5 See Access to Social Media Usernames and Passwords, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/ 
employer-access-to-social-media-passwords-2013.aspx (Nov. 18, 2016). 
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As a necessary consequence of their implementation, employee social 
media privacy laws have prevented at least some discrimination by 
employers.6 Employers are to refrain from requesting any type of access to 
employee or prospective employee social media accounts, and are also well-
advised to hire third parties to monitor any such profiles when monitoring is 
believed to be necessary.7 While failure to follow these rules can result in 
unwanted legal consequences,8 abiding by them might also give employers a 
false sense of security against liability for employment practices. 
Most research dealing with employer liability for discrimination based 
on information accessed through social media examines situations in which 
an employer gains access to protected information about an employee 
through the employee’s social media account(s), and accordingly takes 
adverse action against the employee.9 This Note explores a similar, but 
generally overlooked situation: when employees themselves are lawfully 
connected with one another on various social media platforms, exposing 
coworkers to personal information about one another.10 This exposure creates 
a risk—albeit an indirect one—for even those employers that strive to avoid 
discriminatory decision-making. 
Part I of this Note discusses current employee privacy protections, 
including recent state social media privacy laws and their relevant similarities 
and differences. Part II discusses current employment-related anti-
discrimination laws, and provides an overview of how courts analyze 
                                                                                                                           
 
6 See Mark Bannister et al., Striking Gold, Not Dynamite When Using Social Media in Employment 
Screening, 32 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 1, 21–22 (2014) (“By searching Facebook or other social media 
sites, a potential employer may become . . . aware of protected class information. If an employer uses this 
protected class information in hiring, the employer will have intentionally violated the relevant federal 
and state statutes.”) (footnote omitted). 
7 C. David Morrison & Robert L. Bailey, Employee Privacy Rights: Employer Monitoring and 
Investigating Employees’ Electronic Activities and Communications, 32 ENERGY & MIN. L. INST. 3, 87–
88 (2011). 
8 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
9 See, e.g., Bannister et al., supra note 6 (discussing employers’ explicit use of protected class 
information in employment decisions). 
10 See Janna Andersen & Lee Rainie, Millennials Will Make Online Sharing in Networks a Lifelong 
Habit, PEW RESEARCH CTR., (July 9, 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/2010/07/09/millennials-will-
make-online-sharing-in-networks-a-lifelong-habit/ (finding that the general pattern of disclosure on social 
media that characterizes the millennial generation now, will likely remain constant until at least the year 
2020). 
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associated individual disparate treatment cases.11 Part III explores the 
heightened potential for employer discriminatory liability that results from 
the expansion of information sharing on social media websites. Part III also 
surveys recent cases in which employers were exposed to liability by 
gathering information that led to discovery of covert protected characteristic 
information of a current or prospective employee. Indeed, even when 
employers abide by existing social media privacy laws, they may have a false 
sense of security against liability for workplace discrimination. Part IV 
argues that, because the Internet has transformed the world into a highly 
interconnected information hub, Staub v. Proctor Hospital’s theory of “cat’s 
paw” liability12 should not be expanded to allow employer liability for the 
discriminatory animus of non-supervisory employees. 
I. EMPLOYEE PRIVACY PROTECTIONS ONLINE 
Employees with personal social media accounts are protected from 
intrusions into their privacy through both state social media privacy laws13 
and the Federal Stored Communications Act (SCA).14 Although federal 
                                                                                                                           
 
11 In an individual disparate treatment claim, an employee alleges that he or she was intentionally 
discriminated against on the basis of a protected characteristic. See also discussion infra Part II. 
12 Judge Posner coined the “cat’s paw liability” phrase in employment discrimination law in Shager 
v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). The term “cat’s paw” is derived from a 17th century 
fable in which a cat burns its paws after being lured into getting chestnuts from an open fire by a deceptive 
monkey. The idea, then, is that an employee can hold an innocent employer (the cat) responsible for the 
discriminatory animus of a supervisor (the monkey). Under the so-called “cat’s paw” theory of liability, 
an employer can be held liable for discriminatory animus of one of its employees, when that animus 
(directly or indirectly) leads to an adverse action against the employee. See also discussion infra Part II.B. 
13 Employers conducting business in a number of states are bound by the following social media 
privacy statutes: ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-2-124 (West 2013); CALIF. LAB. CODE § 980 (West 2014); COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-127 (West 2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-40x (West 2016); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 19, § 709A (West 2016); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/10 (West 2014); LA. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 51:1951–1955 (West 2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 616–19 (West 2015); MD. CODE ANN., 
LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712 (West 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.273 (West 2015); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 39-2-307 (West 2015); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.135 (West 2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275:74 
(2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6B-5-10 (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-34 (West 2013); OKLA. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 173.2, 173.3 (West 2014); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.330 (West 2016); 28 R.I. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-56-1 to 28-56-6 (West 2014); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-1-1001 to 50-1-1004 
(West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-48-201 et seq. (West 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 40.1-28.7:5 (West 
2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 49.44.200, 205 (West 2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 995.55 (West 2014). 
14 The Federal Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 2701-11 (2016), provides that whoever 
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social media privacy legislation has been proposed numerous times,15 
nothing has been enacted, leaving states to address the issue of social media 
privacy in the workplace on an individualized basis.16 As a result, the current 
state of social media protection law is varied and complex.17 Indeed, “one of 
the only points of uniformity” among these state laws is the basic prohibition 
they place upon employers to refrain from requesting or requiring that 
applicants or employees disclose their username, password, or other 
information needed to access a personal social media account.18 Most of the 
statutes place this prohibition on employers only, and typically define 
“employer” in a way that includes the employer’s representatives or agents.19 
The laws, indeed, prevent what could be employer coercion. By asking 
employees or prospective employees to share their social media usernames 
and/or passwords, an employer places its employees in a difficult situation. 
If an employee denies the employer’s request, he or she risks being viewed 
negatively. On the other hand, if an employee provides the requested access, 
the employer is now privy to potentially sensitive, personal information 
about the employee’s private life. What the state laws fail to contemplate, 
however, are situations in which employees are lawfully connected with their 
employers, supervisors, or other employees. The assumption here is that the 
                                                                                                                           
 
(1) intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which an electronic 
communication service is provided; or (2) intentionally exceeds an authorization to access 
that facility, and thereby obtains, alters, or prevents the authorized access to a wire or 
electronic communication while in electronic storage in such a system shall be liable for 
damages. 
See also Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hosp. Serv. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 659, 666 (D.N.J. 2013) 
(explaining that Facebook wall posts fall within the purview of the Stored Communications Act). The 
SCA also provides an “authorized user exception,” in which a user can opt to authorize access to a 
normally-restricted website. See id. at 669 (citing Pietrylo v. Hillstone Rest. Grp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
88702, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 25, 2009)). 
15 The proposed federal legislation is the Social Networking Online Protection Act (SNOPA), H.R. 
537, 113th Cong. (2013). 
16 See sources cited supra note 13. 
17 See Brittanee L. Friedman, Note, #PasswordProtection: Uncovering the Inefficiencies of, and 
Not-So-Urgent Need for, State Password-Protection Legislation, 48 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 461, 477–78 
(“The language of these state laws endeavors to protect against the same employer practices, but the laws’ 
inconsistencies create a ‘complex patchwork’ of laws of varying scopes.”) 
18 Grider, supra note 3, at 182. 
19 See sources cited supra note 13. 
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employer did not request or require access in any way, and therefore did not 
violate any applicable state law.20 
Research shows that the aforementioned privacy laws may be largely 
unnecessary—that employers are generally advised to refrain from 
requesting access to employee social media profiles in the first place.21 But 
in an increasingly connected world where individuals are inclined to share 
exceedingly personal information about themselves on the Internet, even 
those employers that take steps to avoid fault by abiding by state social media 
privacy laws and the SCA may remain blind to the possibility of incurring 
liability for discrimination through biases of their other employees, who, as 
co-workers, are even more likely to be connected with one another online.22 
II. INDIVIDUAL DISCRIMINATION LAW 
Since 1963, Congress has passed several laws that prohibit employers 
from discriminating against individuals when making employment decisions. 
In 1963, Congress passed the Equal Pay Act (EPA), which mandates that 
                                                                                                                           
 
20 It is admittedly true that prevention of discrimination is not a stated purpose of most of the state 
social media privacy laws. However, preventing discrimination is one reason that employers are often 
advised to refrain from actually searching for information about an employee online. See Jennifer 
Valentino-Devries, Bosses May Use Social Media to Discriminate Against Job Seekers, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 20, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303755504579208304255139392 
(explaining that while employers avoid asking questions about personal information in interviews, 
technology now makes it easier to find such information: “[Q]uotes from a religious text could indicate a 
person’s religious beliefs, for example, while mentions of a baby registry might suggest a woman is 
pregnant or has children.”). 
21 See Kate Bally, Top Ten Considerations When Using Social Media in the Hiring Process, ASS’N 
CORP. COUNSEL (May 29, 2014), http://www.acc.com/legalresources/publications/topten/ttcwusmithp 
.cfm?makepdf=1 (discussing guidelines to employers with respect to monitoring of employee or applicant 
social media profiles). 
22 See Charlie Osborne, Generation Y ‘Friending’ Facebook colleagues, insight on career 
prospects, ZDNET (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.zdnet.com/article/generation-y-friending-facebook-
colleagues-insight-on-career-prospects-survey/ (“The Gen Y are using social networks as an extension of 
their professional profile, even though they are also using the same platforms to socialize with family and 
friends. Sixty-four percent of the group do not list their employer on their profiles, yet they add an average 
of 16 co-workers each to their contact lists.”); id. (clarifying that 84 percent include at least one connection 
with a coworker on their social media profile; 53 percent have five or more; and 40 percent friend more 
than ten); see also Kenneth Olmstead et al., Social Media and the Workplace, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 
(June 22, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/06/22/social-media-and-the-workplace/ (finding that 
17 percent of workers use social media on the job in order to learn about someone they work with). 
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individuals cannot be paid differently on the basis of their sex.23 Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from taking adverse 
employment actions against employees or prospective employees on the 
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.24 In addition, the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits employers from 
discriminating against employees that are forty years of age or older,25 and 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits employers from 
making hiring decisions or altering application procedures in ways that 
adversely affect individuals with disabilities.26 Most recently, the Genetic 
Information in Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA) was enacted to 
prohibit employers from receiving any type of access to its employees’ 
genetic information—namely, their family medical history.27 In an effort to 
“achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have 
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of [traditionally 
advantaged] employees over other employees,” workplace anti-
discrimination laws provide causes of action to certain groups of employees 
who believe that their employer has intentionally and unlawfully 
discriminated against them.28 
A. Application of Discrimination Laws 
Courts enforce individual discrimination laws in one of two ways. In 
1973, the Supreme Court first established a three-part burden-shifting 
framework.29 This burden-shifting framework, now widely known as the 
“pretext model,” operates such that even circumstantial evidence of 
discrimination may allow a factfinder to infer that intentional discrimination 
has, in fact, occurred.30 An employee alleging intentional discrimination 
                                                                                                                           
 
23 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2016). 
24 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2016). 
25 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2016). 
26 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2016). 
27 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a)). 
28 Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1972)). 
29 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
30 Id. at 804–06. 
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carries the burden of proof,31 and must first plead facts that establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination.32 Namely, an employee must show that (1) he 
or she is a member of a protected class; (2) he or she was qualified for the 
job in question; (3) that an adverse action occurred; and (4) that the 
circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination.33 In a 
discriminatory hiring case, the “inference of discrimination” could be met by 
showing that “the position remained open and the employer continued to seek 
applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications.”34 Once a plaintiff-
employee establishes a prima facie case, it creates an inference of 
discrimination, which the employer can rebut with evidence that 
discrimination was not the reason for the adverse action—that the plaintiff-
employee was, instead, rejected for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.35 
An employer meets its burden by simply articulating any non-discriminatory 
reason for its action.36 Indeed, employers have a burden of production, not 
persuasion, and their fulfillment of this burden eliminates the presumption of 
discrimination originally established by the plaintiff’s prima facie case.37 
If an employer provides, and the court accepts, a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason for its action, then the burden shifts back to the 
plaintiff-employee, who must produce evidence to show that the so-called 
non-discriminatory reason articulated by the employer is simply a pretext for 
discrimination.38 The evidence of pretext can be circumstantial, creating an 
issue of fact, as long as it shows that the employer’s alleged reason is not the 
true reason for the adverse action in question.39 In introducing the pretext 
model in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, the Supreme Court suggested some 
types of evidence that could be sufficient to prove pretext, including: 
                                                                                                                           
 
31 See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (“The ultimate burden 
of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains 
at all times with the plaintiff.”) (citations omitted). 
32 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 802–03. 
36 See, e.g., id. at 802 (emphasis added). 
37 Id. at 803 (“Here petitioner [McDonnell Douglas Corp.] has assigned respondent’s participation 
in unlawful conduct against it as a cause for his rejection. We think this suffices to discharge petitioner’s 
burden of proof at this stage and to meet respondent’s prima facie case of discrimination.”). 
38 Id. at 804–06. 
39 Id. 
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negative prior treatment of the employee during his or her employment, use 
of comparators,40 and evidence that could reveal the employer’s general 
policy or practice of discrimination.41 When an employee or prospective 
employee provides evidence that meets its pretext burden, the question of 
whether there was intentional discrimination on the basis of a protected 
characteristic is one of fact.42 
In 1988, the Supreme Court contemplated a second model for examining 
cases of individual discrimination when it was confronted with a unique set 
of facts in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.43 The plaintiff, a female senior 
manager, sued her employer, Price Waterhouse, for its failure to promote her 
to partner level, alleging that the employer’s action constituted 
discrimination on the basis of sex, a violation of Title VII.44 Price Waterhouse 
admitted that it refused to promote her to partner because a significant 
percentage of the hiring committee viewed her as overly aggressive, abrasive, 
and difficult to work with.45 On that basis, Price Waterhouse argued that the 
plaintiff could not show that she would have been promoted to partner if it 
were not for her status as a female, as was necessary to prove intentional 
discrimination under Title VII—she could not prove that but-for her sex, she 
would have been promoted.46 The Supreme Court disagreed with the 
employer’s argument, holding that when an employee proves that his or her 
protected class status played a role in an adverse employment action, the 
employer must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would 
have made the same decision without consideration of the protected 
characteristic in question.47 In doing so, the Court provided a cause of action 
to a class of cases that the pretext model could not reach, through what is 
                                                                                                                           
 
40 For example, the Court noted that it would be “especially relevant to . . . a showing [of pretext] 
would be evidence that white employees involved in acts against petitioner of comparable seriousness to 
the ‘stall-in’ were nevertheless retained or rehired.” Id. at 805. 
41 Id. at 804–05. 
42 See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 154–55 (2000) (“Given that 
petitioner [employee] established a prima facie case of discrimination, introduced enough evidence for 
the jury to reject respondent's explanation, and produced additional evidence of age-based animus, there 
was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that respondent [employer] had intentionally discriminated.”). 
43 490 U.S. 228 (1988). 
44 Id. at 231–32. 
45 Id. at 234–35. 
46 Id. at 240. 
47 Id. at 258. 
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now labeled the “mixed-motive” framework of analysis.48 In enacting the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress codified the mixed-motive framework, 
providing employees with a cause of action against discriminatory employers 
when an employer’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its adverse 
action is inextricably intertwined with a stereotype specific to a protected 
class.49 The current consensus is that the mixed-motive framework, like the 
pretext framework, allows plaintiff-employees to succeed on a claim of 
individual discrimination short of any direct evidence of such 
discrimination.50 
Because neither of the frameworks requires direct evidence of 
discrimination, the proper application of one over the other is unclear.51 More 
importantly, the mere fact that circumstantial evidence of discrimination 
suffices to prove that such discrimination occurred can be problematic in and 
of itself.52 This Note focuses on a particular type of circumstantial evidence 
of discrimination, which proves to be especially problematic: discriminatory 
animus of agents of the employer, rather than the employer itself.53 
                                                                                                                           
 
48 See Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 113 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013) (“Price 
Waterhouse adopted a complex burden-shifting framework. Congress displaced this framework by 
enacting § 2000e-2(m) (which adopts the motivating-factor standard for status-based discrimination 
claims) . . . .”). 
49 Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 107, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-
5(g)(2)(B) (2016)). The Supreme Court has declined to extend application of the mixed-motive framework 
to age discrimination cases under the ADEA. See Gross v. FLB Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009). 
50 Desert Palace v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99–101 (2003) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) does 
not require plaintiffs to produce direct evidence of discrimination). 
51 See Maya R. Warner, Note, Dare to Step Out of the Fogg: Single-Motive Versus Mixed-Motive 
Analysis in Title VII Employment Discrimination Cases, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 409, 421–22 
(explaining that while lower courts have, in large part, determined that the models are alternatives that the 
plaintiff may select when bringing his or her intentional discrimination case, there is still conflict 
regarding the correct application of the two frameworks). Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Desert Palace failed to indicate whether the mixed-motive framework would completely supplant the 
pretext framework. 
52 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
53 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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B. Circumstantial Evidence of Intentional Discrimination: Staub and Cat’s 
Paw Liability 
In Staub v. Proctor Hospital,54 the Supreme Court examined whether a 
supervisor’s animus against an employee for his military obligations, coupled 
with the employer’s adverse action on the basis of that animus, could serve 
as anti-military discrimination in violation of the Uniformed Services 
Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA).55 The 
Court held that the supervisor’s anti-military animus, along with the 
employer’s resultant adverse action violated USERRA.56 After Staub, a 
supervisor’s discriminatory animus against an employee that induces an 
employer to take an adverse action against an employee can serve as evidence 
of pretext in the pretext model, as well as circumstantial evidence of 
discrimination as a motivating factor under the mixed-motive model.57 This 
so-called “cat’s paw liability” provides plaintiffs with a broad opportunity 
for success in claims of intentional employment discrimination, and expands 
employers’ exposure to liability under those claims.58 
Narrowing the opinion in Staub, the Supreme Court indicated in a 
footnote that it did not intend to express a view on “whether the employer 
would be liable if a co-worker, rather than a supervisor, committed a 
discriminatory act that influenced the ultimate employment decision.”59 Most 
lower courts appeared to follow this narrow interpretation of Staub, declining 
to extend such “cat’s paw liability” to an employer accused of an adverse 
action against an employee based on a non-supervisor employee’s 
                                                                                                                           
 
54 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011). 
55 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4333 (2016). 
56 Staub, 562 U.S. at 422. See also Saviano v. Town of Westport, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112722, 
at *23 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2011) (describing employer liability under Staub as a situation in which “a non-
decision-maker with a discriminatory motive dupes an innocent decision-maker into taking action against 
the plaintiff”). 
57 See Staub, 562 U.S. at 422. 
58 As explained supra note 12, this type of discrimination is described by the term “cat’s paw” 
based on a 17th century fable in which a cat burns its paws after being lured into getting chestnuts from 
an open fire by a deceptive monkey. Similarly, an employee can hold an innocent employer (the cat) 
responsible for the discriminatory animus of a supervisor (the monkey). 
59 Staub, 562 U.S. at 422 n.4. 
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discriminatory animus.60 A number of other courts, however, including the 
First, Second, and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeal and various district 
courts, have declined to preclude such a possibility.61 What began as courts 
inferring that employers could be liable for co-worker animus under the cat’s 
paw theory62 has now evolved into many courts expressly holding that 
employers are, in fact, liable under the theory for the animus of a co-worker. 
For example, in 2012, a district court within the Seventh Circuit, while 
denying a plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, indicated that the 
plaintiff would “not [have] be[en] precluded from asserting a claim based on 
a cat’s paw theory of liability simply because . . . [the employee who 
allegedly had discriminatory animus towards the plaintiff] was a co-worker 
and not a supervisor.”63 Later, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued 
two decisions that gave further insight into its views on the matter: in 
Matthews v. Waukesha County, the court dismissed a plaintiff’s claim against 
her employer for the alleged discriminatory animus of a human resources 
assistant employee, but nevertheless declined to foreclose the possibility that 
such an employee could serve as a source of discriminatory animus in 
disparate treatment claims.64 In Simpson v. Beaver Dam Community 
                                                                                                                           
 
60 John S. Collins, Note, Another Hairball for Employers? “Cat’s Paw” Liability for the 
Discriminatory Acts of Co-Workers After Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 908, 926–28 
(2012). 
61 See Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Serv., 835 F.3d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 2016); Simpson v. Beaver 
Dam Cmty. Hosps., Inc., 780 F.3d 784, 798 (7th Cir. 2015); Matthews v. Waukesha Cnty., 759 F.3d 821, 
829 (7th Cir. 2014); Velazquez-Perez v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., 735 F.3d 265, 273 (1st Cir. 
2014); see also Burlington v. News Corp., 55 F. Supp. 3d 723, 739–39 (E.D. Pa. 2014); Alamjamili v. 
Berglund Chevrolet, Inc., 2011 WL 1479101, at *11 n.3 (W.D. Va. Apr. 18, 2011). 
62 See, e.g., Matthews, 759 F.3d at 829 (failing to uphold the plaintiff’s claim of cat’s paw liability 
on grounds other than the fact that the employee allegedly involved was non-supervisory); Johnson v. 
Koppers, Inc., 2012 WL 1906448, at *6–7 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 2012); Alamjamili, 2011 WL 1479101, at 
*11 n.3 (noting that the plaintiff’s failure to claim that anyone other than the decision-maker influenced 
his termination precluded the application of a cat’s paw theory of liability, thus suggesting that even a 
non-supervisory employee may have the requisite discriminatory animus to impose Staub-like liability 
onto his or her employer if the employee has some decision-making power). 
63 Johnson, 2012 WL 1906448, at *6–7 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 2012); see also Collins, supra note 60. 
But see Schandelmeier-Bartels v. Chicago Park Dist., 634 F.3d 372, 380–81 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that 
in a situation in which a plaintiff asserts cat’s paw liability on the basis of employee animus, that plaintiff 
must put forth evidence showing that the “biased voice mattered” and that the employee with the asserted 
bias had “decisive input in the decision”). 
64 Matthews, 759 F.3d at 829 (reaffirming a prior Seventh Circuit decision, Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 
888 (7th Cir. 2012), in explaining that liability under the cat’s paw theory “can be imposed where a non-
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Hospitals, a decision issued months later, the court stated that “an employer 
can be held liable where a non-decision-making employee with 
discriminatory animus provided factual information or input that may have 
affected the adverse employment action.”65 
Two recent decisions by the First and Second Circuit Courts of Appeal 
prove to be even more significant, demonstrating some courts’ willingness to 
expressly extend liability to employers under a cat’s paw theory even when 
a non-supervisory co-worker is involved. In Velazquez-Perez v. Developers 
Diversified Realty and Vasquez v. Empress Ambulance Service, the First and 
Second Circuits expressly held the following: 
[A]n employer can be held liable under Title VII if: the plaintiff’s co-worker 
makes statements maligning the plaintiff, for discriminatory reasons and with the 
intent to cause the plaintiff’s firing; the co-worker’s discriminatory acts 
proximately cause the plaintiff to be fired; and the employer acts negligently by 
allowing the co-worker’s acts to achieve their desired effect though it knows (or 
reasonably should know) of the discriminatory motivation.66 
III. ONLINE SOCIAL MEDIA: THE HEIGHTENED EXPOSURE OF EMPLOYERS 
TO DISCRIMINATORY LIABILITY 
A social media website is an online forum where the majority of the 
content on the site is user-generated, there is a high level of interaction 
between its users, and in which the website is easily integrated with other 
websites.67 Social media websites include various online platforms, including 
the increasingly prevalent social networking websites such as Facebook, 
                                                                                                                           
 
decision-making employee with discriminatory animus provided factual information or input that may 
have affected the adverse employment action”). 
65 Simpson, 780 F.3d at 798 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). However, non-
decision-making employee statements are unlikely to be admitted as evidence under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 801(d)(2)(D). See Herbert v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No.13 C 4358 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6801 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 2016) (discussing non-decision-making employees’ statements as they 
relate to the federal rules of evidence, stating that “[a] coworker’s out-of-court statement may fall outside 
the hearsay rule under [Rule] 801(d)(2)(D), but only if the coworker’s duties encompassed some 
responsibility related to the decision-making process affecting the employment action”) (internal 
quotations omitted) (citations omitted). 
66 Velazquez-Perez, 735 F.3d 265, 274 (1st Cir. 2014); Vasquez, 835 F.3d 267, 274 (2d Cir. 2016) 
(agreeing with the First Circuit’s holding). 
67 History of Communication from Cave Drawings to the Web, CREATIVE DISPLAYS NOW!, 
http://www.creativedisplaysnow.com/articles/history-of-communication-from-cave-drawings-to-the-
web/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2016). 
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Twitter, YouTube, LinkedIn, and Instagram.68 These platforms promote the 
sharing of a wide range of information between users who “connect” with 
one another.69 
Facebook, the most popular social networking website, is unique in that 
it allows individuals to share the most expansive amount and forms of 
information.70 Users, who connect with other users by becoming “friends,” 
may “post” a myriad of information about topics such as their current mood, 
their views on current news stories, or events in their own daily lives.71 
Unhindered by a word, photograph, or character limit, Facebook users may 
choose to include links to other websites, attach photos or documents, and—
absent specification of a particular desired audience—each post is 
communicated to all of a user’s “friends.”72 Individuals inherently increase 
the amount of information they divulge, or, conversely, that they receive, by 
the simple act of logging onto their (often numerous) social media accounts. 
A. Non-Discriminatory Employment Actions on the Basis of Social Media 
Postings 
It is important for employers to protect their reputations and to ensure 
that employees refrain from divulging trade secrets online,73 and nothing 
prevents employers from monitoring their employees’ social media accounts 
for such information, nor are employers substantively limited in monitoring 
for falsified information that harms their reputation.74 Employers are simply 
                                                                                                                           
 
68 See Top sites in United States, supra note 2. 
69 For example, two individuals who mutually become “friends” on Facebook can view each other’s 
status postings and pictures, and can post things onto each other’s respective Facebook profiles for other 
“friends” to see. Similarly, individuals possessing an Instagram or Twitter account can post pictures or 
thoughts for others who “follow” the individual to see—if an individual opts to make his or her Instagram 
or Twitter account “private,” only those “accepted” users will be able to view the content posted. 
70 FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com (last visited Jan. 10, 2016). 
71 See Reid v. Ingerman Smith, LLP, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182439 (N.Y.E.D.C. 2012) (“Courts 
have found, particularly in cases involving claims of personal injuries, that social media information may 
reflect a plaintiff’s emotional or mental state, her physical condition, activity level, employment, this 
litigation, and the injuries and damages claimed.”) (citing Sourdiff v. Texas Roadhouse Holdings, LLC, 
2011 WL 7560647, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. 2011)) (internal quotations omitted). 
72 Contra TWITTER, https://twitter.com (last visited Jan. 10, 2016) (limiting users to sharing 
“tweets” that are 140 characters or less). 
73 Morrison & Bailey, supra note 7, at 84–114. 
74 Katrina Grider, The “Best of” Litigation Update 2015: Employment Law Update, 70 THE 
ADVOCATE 138, app’x 14 (2015) (“An employee’s comments on social media are generally not protected 
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encouraged to hire an outside party for any necessary monitoring.75 The 
simple act of hiring a third party to monitor social media can protect against 
unwanted liability on the part of employers by preventing the employer’s 
own development of any possible discriminatory animus.76 In lawfully 
monitoring the social profiles of employees, employers may, indeed, 
discover information that they (rightfully) have the power to act upon, 
without exposure to liability under discrimination laws or the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA).77 
Several situations in which employers lawfully took adverse actions on 
the basis of social media posts of employees illustrate this idea. In 2009, 
Domino’s, a well-known pizza delivery chain, fired two employees and 
brought criminal charges against them after the employer discovered that the 
employees posted a video that resulted in severe damage to the company’s 
reputation.78 Similarly, Virgin Airlines fired a number of its employees after 
they unduly criticized their employer’s safety standards on Facebook.79 And, 
in the wake of the “Black Lives Matter” protests in Ferguson, Missouri, a 
hospital in Texas lawfully fired an employee after she posted a “very racist” 
comment about the protest on Facebook.80 
                                                                                                                           
 
if they are mere gripes not made in relation to group activity among employees.”). In the context of public 
employment, see Curran v. Cousins, 509 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that a sheriff’s department was 
justified in terminating a corrections officer when evidence showed that the officer made statements on a 
union website comparing the Sheriff to Hitler). 
75 See Valentino-Devries, supra note 20 (noting an employment law specialist’s advice to 
employers to ensure that they “control the information [they] receive so [they]’re only getting information 
that is legal for [them] to take into account.”). 
76 However, a third party, although hired for their ability to remain neutral, may inform the 
employer one way or another, without recognizing their own fallibility due to subconscious stereotypes. 
77 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2016). The NLRA prohibits employers from encouraging or discouraging 
membership in a labor organization as a term or condition of employment, or in regard to the hire or tenure 
of employment. Id. at § 158(a)(3). More significantly, it deems it an unfair labor practice for employers 
to “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of . . . .” their “right to self-
organization . . . to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in 
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . . .” 
Id. at §§ 157, 158(a)(1). 
78 Stephanie Clifford, Video Prank at Domino’s Taints Brand, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/16/business/media/16dominos.html?_r=0. 
79 Ben Quinn, Virgin sacks 13 over Facebook ‘chav’ remarks, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 31, 2008), 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/nov/01/virgin-atlantic-facebook. 
80 Woman Fired for this Facebook Post About Ferguson, HLNTV (Aug. 22, 2014), http:// 
www.hlntv.com/article/2014/08/22/ferguson-facebook-fired-hospital-employee. 
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B. Discriminatory Liability for Employment Actions Made on the Basis of 
Information Obtained from the Internet 
The type of information that users share today has become exceedingly 
personal.81 While studies indicate that young adults ages 18–29 are likely to 
change their privacy settings to limit what others can view on their social 
networking profiles,82 these individuals are generally “more likely to have 
posted a wide range of personal digital content online.”83 Often, the personal 
information shared with those connections contains details revealing an 
individual’s attributes that may be protected, such as national origin, race, 
gender, religion, age, pregnancy, and disability status.84 Indeed, “[q]uotes 
from a religious text could indicate a person’s beliefs . . . while mentions of 
a baby registry might suggest a woman is pregnant or has children.”85 “A 
tweet can reveal [one’s] place of worship[; a] blog post can imply [one’s] 
sexual orientation . . . [and a] comment on Facebook or an image on a social 
media profile can suggest [one’s] family status.”86 The increasingly personal 
nature of information posted creates vulnerability for employers when 
employees share information exposing a protected characteristic that is not 
otherwise necessarily apparent—for example, religion, disability status, and 
pregnancy. 
While this Note examines discriminatory animus by employees or 
supervisors against a co-worker based on information gained through social 
media interactions, most recent cases addressing discrimination in light of 
social media usage have dealt with first-hand discriminatory intent of an 
employer who gained direct access to covert protected trait information 
                                                                                                                           
 
81 See Madden, Lenhart & Cortesi et al., Teens, Social Media, and Privacy, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 
2–3 (2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2013/05/PIP_TeensSocialMediaandPrivacy_PDF.pdf 
(finding that teens on social media in 2012 shared much more personal information than teens on social 
media in 2006). 
82 Facebook, in particular, allows individuals to change their privacy settings in order to control 
who can see the information they choose to post. 
83 Mary Madden & Aaron Smith, Reputation Management and Social Media: How people monitor 
their identity and search for others online, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 2, 11 (2010), http://www.pewinternet 
.org/files/old-media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Reputation_Management_with_topline.pdf. 
84 Bally, supra note 21. 
85 Valentino-Devries, supra note 20. 
86 Kim Lyons, CMU study finds employer discrimination via social media sites, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE (Nov. 27, 2013), http://www.post-gazette.com/business/2013/11/28/Info-found-on-social-sites-
can-be-off-limits/stories/201311280166. 
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through an individual employee’s social media account or similar website.87 
Researchers indicate that employers that find protected class information of 
applicants from the applicants’ social media websites are likely to utilize that 
information in hiring decisions.88 These cases shed light on the types of 
situations in which employers, previously unaware of individuals’ 
membership in a protected class, were exposed to liability because they 
subsequently learned of protected employee information from social media. 
In 2010, a district court in Kentucky confronted one such case.89 In 
Gaskell v. University of Kentucky, the evidence indicated that the plaintiff, 
Martin Gaskell, was the top applicant for a job as the University of Kentucky 
observatory’s founding director, until the employer found his personal 
website with an article entitled, “Modern Astronomy, the Bible and 
Creation.”90 Asserting that the employer utilized suggestions from his 
website that he may be a “creationist,” to later deny him the position, Gaskell 
claimed that he had been discriminated against on the basis of his religion 
under Title VII.91 Because the employer received emails about the 
employee’s religion from the employee’s website, the employer could not 
prove that it was not on notice of the plaintiff’s religion, and thus did not 
have a viable defense to the plaintiff’s religious discrimination claim.92 The 
district court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment, 
concluding that the case presented an issue of material fact,93 and later, the 
parties agreed to settle the case.94 
An Illinois district court was confronted with a similar issue—this time, 
the plaintiff in the case alleged age discrimination.95 Namely, the plaintiff 
                                                                                                                           
 
87 See Bannister et al., supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
88 Alessandro Acquisti & Christina M. Fong, An Experiment in Hiring Discrimination Via Online 
Social Networks (July 17, 2015), SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2031979; Valentino-Devries, supra 
note 20; Lyons, supra note 86. 
89 Gaskell v. Univ. of Kentucky, No. 09-244-KSF, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124572 (E.D. Ky. 
Nov. 23, 2010). 
90 Id. at *10–11. 
91 Id. at *2. 
92 Id. at *11. 
93 Id. at *29–30. 
94 David Klinghoffer, The Martin Gaskell Case: Not an Isolated Incident, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 3, 
2011), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/258892/martin-gaskell-case-not-isolated-incident-david-
klinghoffer. 
95 Nieman v. Grange Mutual Casualty Co., No. 11-3404, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59180 (C.D. Ill. 
Apr. 26, 2012). 
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claimed that the employer gained information about his age from an Internet 
search of his LinkedIn profile, and refused to hire him on that basis, in 
violation of the ADEA.96 The court held that the plaintiff alleged sufficient 
facts to withstand the defendants’ motions to dismiss his ADEA claims.97 
IV. STAUB’S DANGEROUS APPLICATION IN THE ERA OF INFORMATION 
SHARING: EMPLOYERS THAT ABIDE BY SOCIAL MEDIA PRIVACY LAWS 
STILL AT RISK 
Employers generally have a valid defense to discrimination when they 
can show they were not aware of an employee’s or potential employee’s 
protected class status.98 However, an employer’s unawareness of an 
employee’s protected class status is immaterial when the question is the 
discriminatory animus of a supervisor, or in many cases, a co-worker, which 
resulted in some adverse action.99 The cat’s paw theory of liability essentially 
permits plaintiffs to circumvent the knowledge requirement in ordinary 
discrimination law. 
Staub clarified decades of confusion surrounding the application of the 
cat’s paw theory of liability in employment law,100 and has been recognized 
by some as a step in the right direction for anti-discrimination law.101 But 
even by eliminating one aspect of ambiguity in the doctrine, Justice Scalia, 
in one footnote, failed to address a question that now leaves employers in a 
more unstable position102—especially those conducting business within and 
subject to the jurisdictions of the First, Second, and Seventh Circuit Courts 
                                                                                                                           
 
96 Id. at *4–6. 
97 Id. at *9, *12. 
98 See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 54 n.7 (2003) (in discussing an employer’s 
liability for disability discrimination under the ADA, stating, “[i]f [the employer] were truly unaware that 
such a disability existed, it would be impossible for her hiring decision to have been based, even in part, 
on respondent’s disability”). 
99 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
100 See Benjamin Pepper, Note & Comment, Staub v. Proctor Hospital: A Tenuous Step in the Right 
Direction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 363, 367–81 (2012). 
101 Id. at 377 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s holding ensures that employers cannot insulate 
themselves from liability for discrimination, further perpetuating the purpose of anti-discrimination laws 
in the realm of employment). 
102 The footnote, again, left open the question of whether an employer could ever be held liable for 
discriminatory animus of a co-worker, as opposed to a supervisor. See supra note 60 and accompanying 
text. 
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of Appeal.103 Employers in those jurisdictions may be liable for the 
discriminatory animus of mere co-workers, and no law exists that 
discourages non-supervisory employees, acting outside of the scope of their 
employment, from connecting with one another on social media on their own 
accord. Even outside those jurisdictions, there exists a great possibility that 
even supervisors could be lawfully connected to lower-level employees on 
social media, exposing them to personal information. 
Courts’ willingness to extend Staub to reach discriminatory animus of 
non-supervisory co-workers, exemplified supra Part II.B., is dangerous and 
unfair in light of the technological advances and increased inclination of 
individuals to share personal information about themselves on their social 
media accounts. Under the current state of the law, employers are wrongfully 
exposed to liability for discrimination under the cat’s paw theory of liability 
every day, whether or not they respect the privacy of employees’ social media 
accounts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The recently-enacted state social media privacy laws only provide so 
much protection to employers who abide by them. Indeed, the comingling of 
these privacy laws and the application of anti-discrimination laws through 
the Staub framework leave employers at risk regardless of whether they, or a 
supervisor in their employ, actively request any access to an employee’s 
social media accounts.104 The First, Second, and Seventh Circuit Courts of 
Appeal’s interpretations of Staub are beyond the Supreme Court’s 
contemplation,105 and threaten liability for employers that otherwise take all 
necessary precautions to protect themselves and the privacy of their 
employees. The need to confine the application of cat’s paw liability to 
discriminatory animus of supervisors is especially heightened in a society 
where information sharing is at an all-time high. 
                                                                                                                           
 
103 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
104 Katy Steinmetz, States Rush to Ban Employers from Asking for Social Media Passwords, TIME 
(Apr. 9, 2013), http://swampland.time.com/2013/04/09/states-rush-to-ban-employers-from-asking-for-
social-media-passwords/ (“[E]mployers put themselves at risk if they do ask for access, however: should 
they learn information that they’re not allowed to consider when making a hire—that applicant is, say, 
pregnant—and then don’t give the applicant a job, they’ve opened themselves up to potential lawsuits.”). 
105 See supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text. 
